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Abstract 
This paper aims to investigate the determinants and effects of corporate governance level of the the firms operating in 
Istanbul Stock Exchange. It was drawn that firm value was the most important determinant for corporate governance 
level to be enhanced. Moreover, it was found that firm value mediated corporate investor ratio on corporate 
governance level. On the other hand, there found a positive relationship between growing corporate governance 
implementations of the firms and the firm performance. The manifestation of the agency costs resulting from earnings 
management practices in direction decreasing earnings was seen as a variable that moderates this relationship. Lastly, 
it was concluded that rising corporate governance implementations had impact on foreign investor preference and that 
these investors chosen those firms whose corporate governance implementations were enhanced. 
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1. Introduction 
World economy has been rapidly changed and developed since industrial revolution. Besides, the 
number of the parties increases every day and this leads to a substantially competitive environment. Firms 
willing to outperform in such an environment have intensely strived to specialize operationally and 
administratively, aiming to use production factors efficiently. This process brings about the 
professionalisation causing the ownership and the control to be polarized in the firms. The association 
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between these two polarized groups seems to be directed by the mutual interest at first, whereas it turned 
into a conflict, owing to fact that the executives having expertise and the power of control chase their own 
interests. Similarly, there also exists a conflict between the majority and the minority shareholders, 
resulting from capital shares allocated imbalancedly for various reasons in aggregate corporations. The 
majority shareholders generategreater excess earnings because of the special knowledge.  
These conflicts are called as agency problems in the literature. Agency costs largely damage firms’s 
survival, having impact on their financial structure.Bringing about the untrustable environment, this 
hinders market development. Various institutions have imposed some regulations to solve agency 
problems and hence to create a trustable environment by enhancing firms’s continuity. There also have 
been many studies which resonate with this crucial issue, proposing some precious solutions to the 
agency problems. The concept of corporate governance (henceforth CG) has been originated from these 
valuable efforts.Yet, those efforts bringing about CG do not incorporate coercive rules. Thus, firms 
displaydivergency regarding CG practices.In this context, a sample of the firms trading in Istanbul Stock 
Exchange (henceforth ISE) was employed to investigate the determinants of CG level and its influences 
on the firm performance.  
2. Literature Review 
They are not usually same who place funds and those who manage in the corporations. This distinction 
can be the most essential point that reveals the need of CG (Stuart, 2006).It is not always possible for both 
capital owners and those having control power to strive for common interests simultaneously.The self-
interests of principal partners and senior executives may sometimes dominate the others. While senior 
executives serving their self-interests can manipulate earnings, shareholders and executives who have 
control can transfer the funds to other companies they own by means of transfer pricing or asset stripping 
(La Porta et al., 2000).  
In that context, Aren (2009) in his empirical study on ISE provided evidence that several accounting 
practices known as earnings management (henceforth EM) have been appealed, succeeding the 
management change seen in the companies.Leuz et al. (2003) in their study, encompassing 31 
countries,proposed that EM practices are less likely to be seen in the countries in which have developed 
stock markets, strong investor protection and more dispersed ownership.In their study conducted in 49 
countries, La Porta et al. (1998) mentioned about the relationship between the legal investor protection 
and the law system in a country. Accordingly, there exists a strong investor protection in countries having 
common-law system such as UK and USA, and a weak investor protection in those having civil law 
system. Additionally, they added the ownership concentration(henceforth OC)is considerably high 
especially in countries that gave no investor protection. 
Shleifer and Vishny (1997) manifested that OC was significantly effective in solving the problems 
suggested by agency theory.It is also pointed out that however highly OC minimized agency problems, 
principal partners who having control violated rights of minority shareholders by giving priority to their 
self-interests.La Porta et al. (1999) examined the ownership structure and the shareholders having control 
in large companies and stated thatfirms except those which had strong shareholder protection were mostly 
family or publicly owned.Also, it was seen that firms were not common whose equities were controlled 
by financial intermediaries. The studies conducted in Turkey, as another country which gave weaker 
investor protection (La Porta et al., 1998), also supported these findings. Demirag and Serter (2003) 
expressed that the OC was very high in Turkey and that firms were controlled by families. The same 
study drawned conclusion that pyramidal structure of ownership and big business group gave more 
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control to the firm shareholders than the cash flows did.Shinong et al. (2009) stated no relationship 
between ownership and legal investor protection in terms of firms controlled by the state and that the state 
has protected other investors’ rights by conducting monitoring activities on firms through its force. 
This is especially the case in companies in Europe and Asia which shareholders had more control 
because of pyramidal structure of ownership (Levy, 2007). Faccio and Lang (2002) drawn conclusion that 
controlling shareholders increased their control power in several ways.Dyck and Zingales (2004) and 
Leuz et al. (2003) provided evidence that having control power on a firm has provided some private 
benefits for shareholders.  
Delgado-Garcia et al. (2010) stated that the presence of majority shareholders in firms inferred as a 
power of control and that this was perceived negatively by other shareholders in case of malicious 
handling. Moreover, some studies(Ruiz-Mallorquí &Santana-Martin, 2011) claimed a negative (positive) 
relationship between banking institutions (investment funds) as a dominant shareholder and firm value 
(henceforth FV). The reason for these effects was suggested that firm managers who made an agreement 
with bank managers might use firm’s funds for their private goals and that investmend funds took 
measures for activities which decrease the firm performance.Mizuno (2010) expressed that CG practices 
would be improved qualitatively when corporate investors (henceforth CI) are present.  
Who owns control in a firm is very crucial issue for creditors. It can shift borrowing costs, based on 
firm risk. Hence, it can influence on firm performance. Anderson et al. (2003) found that,in firms having 
founding family ownership structure, borrowingreduced agency costs. Similarly, they added that the 
presence of independent board of directors had same effect on these costs.  
Kim et al. (2007)found a negative (positive) association between minority shareholder rights in a 
country and ownership structure (board independence in a firm). Also, they concluded that stronger legal 
protection of investor in a country was related to more independent board members in firms. Mangena 
and Tauringana (2007), in their research on Zimbabwe Stock Exchange, the second big stock market in 
Africa, they found that the ratio of CI ownership, the percentage of non-executive directors and the 
number of independent auditing members were positively related to shares owned by foreigners. Bae and 
Goyal (2010) stated that foreign shareholders are considerably high in firms whose CG is stronger. Linck 
et al. (2008) stressed that FV, debt ratios, financial performance and being operated in different fields are 
associated with the size of independent board and with the number of independent members. Further, 
Aren et al. (2012) displayed a negative relation between dept ratios and firm profitability in both Taiwan 
and also Turkey.  
3. Methodology 
In this study, it is aimed at investigating the effects of CI level, external financing needs and FV, all of 
which enhance CG level excluding legal regulations. On the other hand, it is intended to examine possible 
relations depending on whether the improvements in CG level have impact on firm’s financial 
performance and being preferred by foreign investors. 
The study sampleincluded 162 firms traded continously on ISE on all indexes, excluding sportive and 
financial indexes. This research based on the secondary data relating firms. Relevant data such asFV, 
external financing needs, firm performance and EM were accessed through Finnet Analiz (Excel Add-In) 
Database while information about corporate and foreign investors were obtained from yearly statistical 
reports on MKK (MKK is the central securities depository for capital market instruments which are 
decided by Capital Markets Board of Turkey to be dematerialized). Lastly, CGdata were acquired by 
compliance reports on firm websites. 
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3.1. Research Model and Hypotheses 
 
CIs aiming at securing their investment returns demand firms for improving CG level such as 
independent auditing boards (Mizuno, 2010). Additionally, CIs make an effort to increase their auditing 
activities on firms in order to attain more investment return (Brav et al., 2008; Del Guercio and Hawkins, 
1999, cited in Hadani et al.,2011; Mande et al., 2012). Thus, the hypothesis derived from here; 
H1: The presence of CIs in the firm increases firm’s level of CG. 
Chen et al. (2010) found a negative relation between external financing needs and FV. Ruiz-Mallorquí 
and Sanatana-Martin (2011) determined a positive relation between FV and the presence of banks as 
controlling shareholders or the second/third big partner. Similarly, Baek et al. (2004) indicated a positive 
association between CIs and FV.  Accordingly, following hypothesis derived;  
H2: There is a positive relationship between no external financing needs and existence of CIsand firm 
size. 
Mande et al. (2012) pointed out that small firms had lower CGlevels owing to inadequate monitoring 
by the public. Aksu and Kosedag (2006) reported that large firms would improve their CGsince they were 
monitored especially by financial intermediaries. Linck et al. (2008) and Coles et al. (2008) stressed that 
firms with higher FVare more likely to enlarge their boards and to increase independent members in those 
boards. Thus, the hypothesis starting from this, 
H3: There is a positive relationship between firm size and CG level. 
Mizuno (2010) and Mande et al. (2012) indicated a positive relation between CI ratio and CG level. 
Linck et al. (2008) and Guest (2008) referred a positive relation between FV and CG. Ruiz-Mallorquí and 
Santana-Martin (2011) mentioned about a positive association between CI ratio and FV, known as the 
determinants of CG level. Additionally, Guest (2008) pointed that FV is a crucial determinant of CG 
level. Both these triple relations existed among them and FV being an important determinant of CG level 
raised doubts whether FV mediates CI ratio on CG level. Accordingly, the following hypothesis; 
H4: FV mediates CI ratio on CG level. 
Theoretically, the relationship between CG and financial performance depend upon agency problems 
among shareholders originating from information asymmetry (Jensen and Mecling, 1976). La Porta et al. 
(1999) reached findings that controlling shareholders with a motive to preserve their earnings can exploit 
firm’s resources, leading to a decrease in firm value. Beside, Gompers et al. (2003) expressed that CG 
level in firms related to stock return. Klapper and Love (2004) determined a relationship between CG 
level and firm’s both Tobin’s Q and ROA. Kula (2005) reported a relation between the separation of CEO 
and executers and firm performance. Starting from here, the hypothesis; 
H5a: When CG level increases, firm profitability (EBIT/Total Assets) increases too.  
H5b:  When CG level increases, firm’s Tobin’s Q ratio increases too. 
Lack of transparency in firms may leads to problems based on information asymmetry. These 
problems cause an increase of risk premium in calculation of return on investment. Hence, foreign 
investors would make their investment preferences on those firms with lower information 
asymmetry(Jiang ve Kim, 2004). Beside, Mangena and Tauringana (2007) and Barniv and Bao (2009) 
expressed that foreign investors took firms’ CG mechanisms into consideration while choosing their 
investments. Accordingly, the subsequent hypothesis;     
H6: When CG level increases in the firm, foreign investors in a country make more preferences on that 
firm.  
Klapper and Love (2004) and Gompers et al. (2003) stated that CG practices improved firm 
performance thereby reducing firm’s agency costs. Hazarika et al. (2012) and Hadani et al. (2011) pointed 
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out that EM practices in firms increased agency costs. Hence, agency costs were apparent in firms 
practicing EM and improving CG practices in these firms whose agency costs are apparent were more 
effective in enhancing firm performance than those having inapparent agency costs. Accordingly, the next 
hypotheses; 
H7a: EM activities in decreasing earnings way moderates CG on firm performance (EBIT/Tot.Ass.) 
H7b: EM activities in decreasing earnings way moderates CG on firm performance (Tobin’s Q). 
The research model encompassing the hypotheses is depicted below.  
 
 
 
 
Table 1: Variables in the Research Model 
Variable CALCULATION REFERENCES CITED BY 
Market Value Natural logarithm of firm value at the end of year 2009 was used. 
Finnet Analysis (Excel 
Add-In) Database 
Aksu and Kösedağ, 
(2006), Yu, 2008, 
Lasfer, 2006). 
Ext. Financing 
Needs 
“1”, The presence of external financing needs if the 
discrepancy between Total Assets Growth 
Percentage and ROE/(1-ROE) ratios greater than 
zero, otherwise  “0” 
Finnet Analysis (Excel 
Add-In) Database 
Demirgüc-Kunt and 
Maksimovic (1998) 
and Modified approach 
of Durnev and Kim 
(2005) cited in  Chen 
et al.( 2010). 
Corp. Investor 
Ratio Corporate Investor Stocks / Total Stocks  
MKK and Finnet Analysis 
(Excel Add-In) Database Mizuno, (2010) 
CG Level 
1. ‘1’, if the number of board members of related firm 
greater than the sample, otherwise ‘0’ 
2. ‘1’, if the number of non-executer members gerater 
than executer members in related firm ‘1’, otherwise 
‘0’, 
3. ‘1’, if independent members having qualifications 
specified by Capital Market Board exist in related firm, 
otherwise, ‘0’ 
4. ‘1’, related firm establish a corporate governance 
committee in their independence board, otherwise, ‘0’ 
5. ‘1’, the same person does not hold director of both 
independent board and also ecexutive board, otherwise 
‘0’ 
6. ‘1’, related firm gets the independence auditing 
service from Price Waterhouse Coopers, Deloitte 
Touche Tohmatsu, Ernst & Young and KPMG, known 
as the big four, otherwise, ‘0’  
Max.6 Points 
Firms’ websites 
Mitton, (2002) Forbes 
and Milliken, (1999), 
Goodstein et al., 
(1994),  Mak and 
Roush, (2000), 
Filatotchev and 
Nakajima, (2010), 
Bhagat and Black, 
(1999), Klein, (2002) 
Jensen, (1993) 
EM Modified Jones Model Finnet Analysis (Excel Add-In) Database Aren (2003) 
Firm Performance ROA and Tobin’s Q Finnet Analysis (Excel Add-In) Database 
Klapper and Love, 
2004 
Foreign Investor 
Preference 
Foreign investor shares / total foreign investor shares 
in the stock market  MKK 
Mangena and 
Tauringana, 2007 
H5a 
H5b 
H6 
H2 
H2 
H1 
H3 
H7b 
H7a 
Foreign Investor Ratio in Total (10) 
Tobin’s Q (10) 
EBIT/Tot.Ass. (10) 
CG Level (10) 
External Financing Needs (09) 
Corporate Investor(09) 
Firm Size (09) 
EM Activities Smaller Than Zero (09) 
Fig 1. Research Model 
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3.2. Analysis 
 
In this section, the research hypotheses will be tested successively in an effort to search their precision 
and the findings relating to validation of the model will be discussed.  
     H1: The presence of CIs in the firm increases firm’s level of CG. 
To test this hypothesis, simple regression model is given below in equation (1).  
            (1) 
In the regression model above, the subscripts t-1 and t represent years 2009 and 2010 respectively. 
Table 2. Regression Analysis Results of Corporate Investor Ratio on CG Level 
REGRESSION ANALYSIS VARIABLES β P R2 P 
Dependent Variable CG Level   
0,634 0,000 Independent Variables Corporate Investor Ratio 0,798 0,000 
 
The regression results show a statistically significant relation between CI ratio and CG level. Beside, 
the model is significant overall and CI ratio is explaining nearly 64 % of the total variation in CG level. 
An increase of one point in CI ratio causes an increase of 0,798 in CG.Thus, H1 is supported. 
H2: There is a positive relationship between no external financing needs and existence of CI and firm size. 
The simple regression model to test related hypothesis can be seen in equation (2) below. 
          (2) 
Table 3. Regression Analysis Results of Corporate Investor Ratio, External Financing Needs on Firm Value 
REGRESSION ANALYSIS VARIABLES β P R2 P 
Dependent Variable Firm Value   
0,430 0,000 Independent Variables 
 
Corporate Investor Ratio  0,632 0,000 
External Financing Needs -0,130 0,032 
 
Being significant at the 0.000 observed level, 43% of total variation in FV is explained by CI ratio and 
external financing needs. Individually, if CI ratio (external financing need) increases (decreases) by 1 
unit, then FV increases by 0,63 (0.13) unit. CI ratio (external financing need) is significant at 0.000 (0.05) 
observed levels.  As a result, the hypothesis H2 is supported. 
H3: There is a positive relationship between firm size and CG level. 
The simple regression model specified to test the related hypothesis is given in equation (3). 
            (3) 
Table 4. Regression Analysis Results of Firm Value on CG Level 
REGRESSION ANALYSIS VARIABLES β P R2 P 
Dependent Variable CG Level   
0,828 0,000 Independent Variables Firm Value 0,911 0,000 
 
As seen on Table 4, nearly 83 % of total variation in CG level is explained by FV. 1 % change in FV 
causes a change of 0.911 in CG level. It can be seen that FV is a crucial determinant of CG level. 
H4: FV mediates CI ratio on CG level. 
As known, for the presence of any mediating variable, it is necessary that there must be relations 
denoted by I, II ve III in figure 2 and that the relation denoted by III must be decreasing or completely 
disappearant after the inclusion of the mediating variable (Demircan, 2003 cited in Alpkan et al., 2005).    
 
Fig 2. Mediating Effect 
III 
II 
I 
Dependent Variable Independent Variable 
Mediating Variable 
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Table 5. Results of Correlation Analysis Between Corporate Investor Ratio, Firm Value and Corporate Governance Level 
CORRELATION ANALYSIS Corporate Investor Firm Value Corporate Governance Level 
Corporate Investor Ratio 1 0,648** 0,375** 
Firm Value 0,648** 1 0,516** 
Corporate Governance Level 0,375** 0,516** 1 
** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level. 
 
On Table 5, it seems that, CI ratio, FV and CG level are significantly correlated at 99 % 
level.Following this analysis, the regression results produced from equation (4) are reported below. 
                                        (4) 
 
Table 6. Regression Analysis Results of Corporate Investor, Firm Value on CG Level 
REGRESSION ANALYSIS VARIABLES β P R2 P 
Dependent Variable CG Level   
0,259 0,000 İndependent Variables Corporate Investor Ratio 0,07 0,433 
 Firm Value 0,47 0,000 
 
Although CI ratio was significant at the model in context of the hypothesis H1, it is not significant at 
nearly 0,5 observed level because FV mediates this relation. Summarizing the analyses in order to 
determine CG level, however FV is a substantial determinant of CG level and so is CI ratio individually, 
FV mediates CI ratio on CG level. Yet, CI ratio and external financing needs have effect on CG level 
through FV. 
H5a: When CG level increases, firm profitability (EBIT/Total Assets) increases too.  
H5b:  When CG level increases, firm’s Tobins Q ratio increases too. 
To test the hypotheses H5a and H5b, simple regression models below are specified.  
          (5) 
                     (6) 
 
Table 7. Regression Analysis Results of Corporate Governance Level on EBIT/Tot. Ass.  
REGRESSION ANALYSIS VARIABLES β P R2 P 
Dependent Variable EBIT/ Tot.Ass.   0,384 0,000 Independent Variables Corporate Governance Level 0,623 0,000 
 
Table 7 shows the results of testing the hypothesis H5a. 38,4% of total variation in EBIT/Tot. Ass. is 
explained by CG level, with 0,000 observed or exact level of significance. Hence, H5a is supported.   
 
Table 8. Regression Analysis Results of CG Level on Tobin’s Q  
REGRESSION ANALYSIS VARIABLES β P R2 P 
Dependent Variable Tobin’s Q   0,275 0,000 Independent Variables CG Level 0,529 0,000 
 
Similarly, CG level explains 28% of total variation in Tobin’s Q with 0,000 observed level of 
significance. Hence, the hypothesis H5b is supported. 
H6: When CG level increases in the firm, foreign investors in a country make more preferences on that 
firm.  
 
Table 9. Regression Analysis Results of CG Level on Total Foreign Investor Share 
REGRESSION ANALYSIS VARIABLES β P R2 P 
Dependent Variable Total Foreign Investor Share   0,121 0,000 Independent Variables CG Level 0,355 0,000 
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As seen above, the effect of CG level in a firm on preferences of foreign investors in a country is 
significant at 0,000 observed level of significance. Moreover, CG level explains 12,1% of total variation 
in total foreign investor ratio.  
H7a: EM activities in decreasing earnings way moderates CG on firm performance (EBIT/Tot.Ass.) 
H7b: EM activities in decreasing earnings way moderates CG on firm performance (Tobin’s Q). 
To determine firm’s EM activities, Modified Jones Model is employed. In the light of this model, 
discreationary accruals of each firm were calculated, searching for EM activities’direction. It is expected 
that the activities in the direction of reducing earnings (negative discreationary accruals) in t-1 period-one 
year before when CG level calculated- would increase earnings together with the CG level in t period. 
Firstly, firms were divided in two groups: whose discreationary accruals is smaller than zero and greater 
than zero.  
 
Table 10. One Sample T Test Results 
 Mean Test Value t  p 
Firms whose discretionary accruals are below than “0”’ –0,0341910 0 1,901 0,074 
 
As seen, at 0,10 exact significance level, discreationary accruals mean is different from ‘0’ , the mean 
in case of no EM activities. This finding leads to analyzing the relationship between CG level and both 
EBIT/Tot. Ass. and also Tobin’s Q in firms havingEM facilities in earning reducing way in 2009. 
 
Table 11. Regression Analysis Results of  CG Level on EBIT/ Tot.Ass. 
REGRESSION ANALYSIS VARIABLES β P R2 P 
Dependent Variable EBIT/ Tot.Ass.   0,745 0,000 Independent Variables CG Level 0,871 0,000 
 
As seen on Table 11, the coefficient of CG level in the context of the model encompassing H5a 
increased to 0,871 from 0,623. Last, H7a is supported. Below, Table 12 showsH7b is supported as well. 
 
Table 12. Regression Analysis Results of Corporate Governance on Tobin’s Q  
REGRESSION ANALYSIS VARIABLES β P R2 P 
Dependent Variable Tobin’s Q   0,658 0,000 
İndependent Variables Corporate Governance Level 0,823 0,000 
4. Conclusion 
Currently, the structures of the ownership and the control diverge from eachother owing to fact both 
that firms have been growing and also that the need of senior executives is increasing. This divergency 
grounding on mutual benefits at first leads to the conflict of interest in several ways in the firm since 
senior executives with controlling power exploit their private knowledge for their self interests. Agency 
problems originated from this discrimination between the ownership and the control causes serious 
damages to firms. To reduce the costs stemmed from these problems, a variety of individuals and 
institutions gave some suggestions and made arrangements, all of which created the concept of CG. 
In our study, the determinants and the effects of CG has been investigated on a sample of firms traded 
on ISE. In this direction, study’s theoretical model has formed in line with the relationships in extant 
literature. In the research model, CI ratio, firm size, external financing needs are supposed as the 
determinants of CG level and an array of tests has been made in searching for these presuppositions to be 
supported or not. On the other side, the effects of CG level have been identified through the analyses of 
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the relationships between CG level, firm performance and foreign investor preferences. Hence, it was 
found that FV-hence firm size- is the most crucial determinant of CG in firms. Parallel with literature, this 
finding can be interpreted in way that firms choose improving their CG level in order not to damage their 
institutional reputation. Moreover, it is seen that CI ratio is another major determinant of CG level. The 
indirect effect of CI ratio on CG level is conveyed through FV since it mediates this relation.  Namely,CI 
ratio together with external financing needs can effectCG level only through FV. The results also 
exhibited thatCG level enhances firm performance. Beside, this effect was moderated by appearance of 
agency costs afterEM facilities in last year. Firms can improve their financial performance via CG 
practices in the same way which they eliminate the costs stemmed from interest conflicts related 
asymmetric information. Last, it is also concluded that foreign investors take the firm’s CG level into 
account on their firm preferences. 
This study remained limited with the firms only traded on ISE regarding both the access to financial 
statements, the information about independence board structure of firms and also acquisition of the 
knowledge on their foreign investors’ share. Turkish Commercial Code newly enacted by 2012 
necessitates all firmsto report their financial statements. This enables working with larger samples in the 
future, giving way to reach more generalizable results.Future studies can carry our study furher if they 
take this change into account. 
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